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We study risk preferences and their determinants for commercial cattle farmers in Namibia 
who are subject to high and heterogeneous precipitation risk, using data from questionnaire 
and field experiments, simulated data for on-farm precipitation risk and data on famers’ 
previous place of residence. We find that the relationship between risk preferences and 
precipitation risk is contingent on early-life experience with this risk. We also find that adult 
farmers self-select themselves onto farms according to their risk preferences. Results are not 
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11. Introduction 
Behavior towards risk, as the interplay between risk preferences and the opportunity set, plays 
an important role in economic life. Everybody experiences risks in one’s every-day economic 
life. But few people experience the same type of risk that determines their income throughout 
their entire life. Rangeland farmers in semi-arid regions are among them, with their livelihood 
essentially depending on environmental risks. These farmers are therefore particularly well 
suited to study the determinants that drive risk behavior, especially risk preferences.  
Previous studies on the interaction between risk preferences and environmental risk assumed 
risk preferences to be stable and then examined how a change in risk constraints induces a 
behavioral change (e.g. Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). However, recent studies 
demonstrate that risk preferences endogenously change with external cues such as market 
arrangements (Palacios-Huerta and Santos, 2004), civil war shocks (Voors et al., 2011) and 
possibly macroeconomic shocks (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). In this paper, we empirically 
study risk preferences and their determinants, with a specific focus on whether risk 
preferences change with early-life experience with environmental risk. 
Our case study is commercial cattle farming in semi-arid rangelands of Namibia. Farmers in 
these areas experience a variety of socio-economic and environmental risks, predominant 
among which is precipitation risk. Annual precipitation in Namibia is low with an average of 
approximately 270 mm, and spatially and temporally highly variable (Sweet, 1998; Ward et 
al., 2004; Wiegand et al., 2005; Chapman, 2010, see also Figure 1). In addition to 
precipitation risk, farmers face prices risk for inputs and outputs, the latter of which comprise 
of cattle sold to the slaughterhouse or at local auctions. These prices may be very volatile; for 
example, prices for auction sales may increase or decrease by more than 50% from one year 
to the next (Olbrich et al., 2011c). In commercial cattle farming, land property rights are 
assigned to individual farmers.
1 The market for farmland is well developed which allows the 
purchase of farms anywhere within the commercial farming region. Roughly half of the 
farmer population operates on a farm that they purchased , whereas the other half stays on the 
farm where they grew up and which they took over from their parents. 
We experimentally elicit risk preferences both in questionnaire experiments with hypothetical 
payouts and in-field experiments with real payouts in August 2008. The farms operated by the 
participants in the experiments are distributed over the whole region in Namibia where 
                                                 
1 In this respect, commercial cattle farming differs from communal farming, the other main farming system 
performed in northern and eastern Namibia, where rangelands are used as a common property resource mainly 
for subsistence farming.  
2commercial cattle farming is common (Figure 1) (Mendelsohn, 2006: 43). We complement 
our survey data with actual and simulated on-farm precipitation data and by farm records of 
the Deed’s Office of Namibia which detail farm ownership since 1920. We investigate the 
impact of precipitation risk
2 and experience with this risk during childhood and adolescence 
on the coefficient of relative risk aversion by maximum likelihood estimation, controlling for 
socio-demographic variables, liquidity constraint and price background risk.   
We find that risk aversion and environmental risk are negatively related if we do not account 
for prior risk experience. This observation is consistent with self-selection where more risk 
averse farmers occupy less  risky  farms. However, once we take into account prior risk 
experience during childhood and adolescence we find that risk preferences are endogenous 
with respect to environmental risk: among those farmers who grew up on the farm they 
currently operate, the individual is more risk averse the more years it has spent on this farm 
prior to age 18 years. Eventually, past risk experience becomes the dominant feature of the 
relationship between risk preferences and environmental risk: farmers who grew up on their 
farm for at least 10 years during childhood or adolescence are the more risk averse the higher 
the precipitation risk is on their farm, i.e. the more risky their farm is. We thus conclude that 
risk preferences are endogenous with respect to environmental risk.  
We can exclude two alternative explanations for our results. Precipitation risk may act as a 
background risk to choices in our risk experiments, but we can exclude its possibly 
confounding influence on the grounds of previous literature findings pertaining to the sign of 
its effect on risk aversion. Liquidity constraint has no significant influence on risk aversion, 
and all price-background risks are homogenous across farmers and therefore cannot explain 
individual heterogeneity in behavior towards risk. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the conceptual background. Section 3 
describes the methods used to collect and analyze our data. Results are presented in Section 4. 




                                                 
2 One might argue that the relevant risk is profits from cattle farming and not precipitation. However, from 
qualitative interviews with farmers we infer that they are preoccupied with precipitation of which they keep very 
detailed records. Conversely, data on profits are seldom recorded. We thus assume that precipitation is indeed 
the relevant risk and that the profit risk (in the mindset of farmers) is linearly related to precipitation risk.  
32. Conceptual background and hypotheses 
The relationship between an individual’s risk preferences and risk can be driven by formation 
of risk preferences through given risk conditions (“endogeneity of risk preferences”) and by 
choice of risk conditions according to given risk preferences (“self-selection”). In this section, 
we explain these two mechanisms and derive hypotheses concerning endogeneity of 
preferences and self-selection that pertain to commercial cattle farming in Namibia. 
2.1 Endogeneity of risk preferences 
One possible mechanism driving the relationship between risk preferences and risk is that 
preferences are formed by given risk conditions that individuals experience. Endogeneity of 
risk preferences has been studied for a variety of contexts. They are relatively stable over time 
(Harrison et al., 2005b; Andersen et al., 2008b; Sahm, 2008), with respect to changes in 
income and wealth (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; Sahm, 2008) and under major shocks like 
job displacement (Sahm, 2008). However, they change with age (Dohmen et al., 2005; Sahm, 
2008; Harrison et al., 2010) and are endogenous with respect to external cues. Palacios-Huerta 
and Santos (2004), assuming a general equilibrium model in which preferences are 
endogenous with respect to market arrangements, observe that individuals are less risk-averse 
when markets are incomplete and provide less institutional risk mitigation which 
consequently leave those individuals more vulnerable to risk. Voors et al. (2011) study how 
risk preferences are affected by civil war shocks. They find, that those individuals who 
experienced higher violence, in the sense that their community has suffered a higher number 
of casualties, were more risk seeking. Finally, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that 
individuals who have experienced worse stock and bond market conditions, in the form of low 
returns, take less financial risks. They attribute this relationship to formation of more 
pessimistic beliefs about future returns, but cannot discard the possibility of endogeneity of 
risk preferences. As of yet, no economic study considered environmental risk as an external 
cue that may form risk preferences. Moreover, to our knowledge no economic study has yet 
examined childhood or adolescence as a period of risk preference formation, even though this 
period is critical for the formation of a variety of preferences (e.g. Cunha & Heckman 2007, 
Borghans et al. 2008, Cunha et al. 2010). 
Insights on requirements and processes for formation of risk preferences are provided by the 
psychological literature. Firstly, important cognitive requirements for risk preferences such as 
logical reasoning are in place at the end of childhood (e.g. Boyer, 2006; Reyna and Farley, 
2006), meaning that older children and adolescents do indeed have risk preferences that allow 
4a rational evaluation of risky alternatives. Secondly, these preferences may change during 
childhood and adolescence through a variety of processes. One of these processes is a 
systematic preference shift with age in response to certain external cues an individual 
experiences (Bowles, 1998; Loewenstein and Angner, 2003) – a process called maturation 
(Loewenstein and Angner, 2003). In maturation, preferences may shift more strongly the 
longer the cue is experienced, but eventually ‘different types of preferences tend to become 
“frozen” at different periods in one’s life … [and thereby people] become increasingly 
inoculated against external influences’ (Loewenstein and Angner, 2003: 363) (similarly 
Holbrook and Schindler, 2003). For example, people prefer throughout their life the movie 
stars photographs of their teens (Holbrook and Schindler, 1994) and the music of their mid-
twenties (Holbrook and Schindler, 1989), and young adulthood is an important period for the 
formation of political parties preferences (Gerber and Green, 1998). 
Turning to commercial cattle farming in Namibia we first note that this farming is driven by 
precipitation risk. Along the lines of maturation, precipitation risk may constitute a strong 
external cue that acts on farmers’ risk preferences throughout childhood and adolescence. 
Thus, we hypothesize that farmers’ risk preferences are endogenous with respect to the 
precipitation risk experienced during childhood and adolescence and that precipitation risk 
forms preferences more strongly the longer farmers have experienced this risk. 
2.2 Self-selection on the land market 
Another possible mechanism driving the relationship between risk preferences and risk is that 
individuals self-select themselves into risk conditions according to their given risk 
preferences, with more risk averse individuals choosing less risky conditions. Evidence 
conform with self-selection has been observed, for example, in regards to occupational choice 
(Dohmen et al., 2005; Guiso and Paiella, 2005; Bellemare and Shearer, 2010; Jaeger et al., 
2010) , investment choice (Dohmen et al., 2005; Guiso and Paiella, 2005) and health behavior 
(Dohmen et al., 2005).  
For commercial cattle farmers in Namibia the land market is the main mechanism that may 
lead to a self-selection of farmers onto farms differing in precipitation risk according to their 
risk preferences. To be precise about how self-selection on such a land market works, 
consider the following model of rangeland farming and the market for farms. The grazing 
capacity (i.e. the state of the grass vegetation) of the rangeland is described by a stock 
variable  t x that follows a geometric Brownian motion with zero mean growth rate (i.e. we 
consider a steady state) and a standard deviation  of the growth rate that is determined by 
5uncertainty of rainfall. Using  0 x  to denote the state of vegetation at time  0 t  , the state  t x at 
time  t  follows a log-normal distribution with mean  0 x  and variance   
22
0 exp( ) 1 xt    (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). Annual rents derived from rangeland farming are proportional to the 
grazing capacity of the rangeland in the year under consideration. To keep notation simple, 
we normalize annual income from rangeland farming such that it equals t x . The farm, in this 
simple model, is characterized by the expected annual state of the vegetation  0 x  and by the 
standard deviation   that is determined by rainfall uncertainty at the farm’s location. We 












which exhibits constant relative risk aversion with a coefficient of 
(constant) relative risk aversion r . Further, we use   to denote the farmer’s time preference 




0 rr    and 
2 1
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   to ensure the existence of an interior solution 
to the farmer’s optimization problem. The condition 
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2
    states that uncertainty should 




0 rr     is always fulfilled for 
farmers with a coefficient of risk aversion  1 r  . For more risk-averse farmers,  1 r  , a farm 
that is very risky compared to the farmer’s discount rate would be of no use (the present value 




0 rr     thus means that we consider only 
farms for which a risk-averse farmer would offer a positive bid. The expected present value of 
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   .  (1) 
We now consider the land market where farmers bid for farms. The bidders differ with regard 
to their risk and time preferences and with regard to their reservation utility levels. We use 
0 y to denote the certain and constant income stream that would give rise to the reservation 
utility level of the farmer under consideration. The maximal constant fraction  of annual 


















6The allocation on this land market is characterized by the following result: 
 
Proposition:   If two farmers with identical discount rates bid the same constant fraction  of 
annual income for a farm  0 (,) x  , then the more risk-averse farmer outbids the 
less risk-averse farmer for all less risky farms  0 (,) x  with     and the less 
risk-averse farmer outbids the more risk-averse farmer for all riskier 
farms 0 (,) x  with    .  
 
Proof:    see Appendix A.1. 
 
Based on the proposition we hypothesize that farmers self-select themselves onto farms 
according to their given risk preferences in such a way that more risk-averse farmers operate 
on farms with less risky precipitation conditions. 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data sources 
Description of the survey 
In August 2008, we elicited risk preferences as well as personal, farm business and 
environmental characteristics of commercial cattle farmers in Namibia in a quantitative 
survey, consisting of a mail-in questionnaire and in-field experiments. A detailed description 
of the survey, its conduction and an analysis of representativeness of the survey population 
can be found in Olbrich et al. (2009).  
We sent out questionnaires to all 1,121 cattle farming members of the Namibia Agricultural 
Union (NAU), the main interest group of commercial farmers in Namibia, and to all 795 
farmers that deliver cattle to MeatCo, by far the largest slaughterhouse in Namibia. We 
mailed out a first batch of questionnaires in the period 19
th – 21
st of August 2008, and a 
second batch as a follow up on the 15
th of September 2008.  
In addition, we randomly selected 39 NAU members for participation in in-field risk 
experiments. We visited the majority of these participants (79.4%) on their respective farms, 
and the remaining ones at pubic locations in major cities. With one exception,
3 each session of 
experiments started with the participant filling in the questionnaire and was followed by the 
experiments. Duration of sessions varied between one and two-and-a-half hours.  
                                                 
3 Upon arrival at the meeting the farmer remarked that his time would not permit both filling-in of the 
questionnaire and conducting experiments. We thus chose to elicit only selected data in the questionnaire and 
directly proceeded to the experiments. After the experiments, we asked the farmer to mail or fax us a completed 
questionnaire, but unfortunately the farmer never sent a questionnaire.  
7Altogether, we reached 1,916 of an estimated total number of 2,500 commercial cattle farmers 
(76.6%).
4 399 questionnaires were returned, equaling a return rate of 20.8%. In the returned 
questionnaires, response rate for non-sensitive questions exceeded 95% for most questions, 
and response rate was greater than 90% for sensitive questions such as income. An optional 
question for identification of the farm was answered by 75.1% of survey participants. This 
question enables us to pinpoint the location of the farm and link survey data to data from 
external sources such as precipitation data from the REMO climate model and the farm 
records of the Deed’s Office of Namibia (see below). 
In addition to the quantitative survey, we conducted 62 qualitative interviews with farmers 
and decision makers in the agricultural, financial and political sector in which we discussed 
vary aspects of commercial cattle farming. Interviews took place throughout four research 
visits in March/April 2007, October 2007, July/August 2008 and February/March 2010. 
Elicitation of risk preferences 
We elicited risk preferences in the sense of von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by an adapted multiple price list format 
(Binswanger, 1980; Holt and Laury, 2002; Andersen et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2010), both 
through experiments with hypothetical payouts within the questionnaire (“questionnaire 
experiments”) and through in-field experiments (“field experiments”) with payouts of real 
money . In the questionnaire experiments we offered farmers six scenarios, where we framed 
the lottery in the context of selling cattle at an auction (Table 1a). The auction had two 
possible outcomes, N$90,000
5 and N$130,000, each occurring with equal probability of 1/2. 
The expected value of the auction (N$110,000) corresponds to about 1/3 of the annual net 
income of the average farmer. Instead of taking part in the uncertain auction, farmers could 
chose to sell to a trader for a certain amount which started at N$100,000 in the first scenario 
and increased in steps of N$2,500 to N$112,500 in the sixth and last scenario.  
In the field experiments the lottery was context-free with two possible outcomes, N$500 and 
N$2,500, each occurring with equal probability of 1/2. The expected value of N$1,500 
corresponds to the value of a calf. To achieve a higher resolution of risk aversion measures, 
16 scenarios were presented. The certain amount started at N$550 in the first scenario and 
increased to N$1,900 in the last scenario (Table 1b). After the subject had made their choices 
                                                 
4 No census data is available that gives the exact number of cattle farmers. The estimate derives from experts of 
the Namibia Agricultural Union and the Meat Board of Namibia.  
5 On the 1
st of August 2008, N$1,000 equalled €88.14 or US$137.50. 
8one of the chosen scenarios was randomly picked (by throwing a dice) and paid out, i.e. the 
subject either received the certain amount or the lottery in turn was played out (again by 
throwing a dice). Due to monetary constraints we could pay only 10% of farmers which were 
randomly selected by letting farmers draw lots. Payments were made in cash instantly.  
Based on the choices observed in each scenario we estimate the risk-aversion parameter of a 
Constant-Relative-Risk-Aversion (CRRA) specification of an expected utility function 
(Andersen et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2010). In the specification U(y) = y
(1-r) / (1-r) we use y 
to denote lottery pay-out and r to denote the (constant) coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Based on this function, indifference between the lotteries and the certain amount in the 
different scenarios corresponds to values of r in the range -1.40 and 6.32 for the questionnaire 
experiments, and -1.46 and 8.27 in the field experiments. 
Farmers’ life history 
To infer since when farmers lived on their farm, we examined records of farm deeds from the 
Deed’s Office of Namibia. For a given farm these records denote every transaction, reaching 
as far back in time as 1920, and include the transaction date, the transferred area and the 
names of transferors and transferees. Matching this information with survey information for 
those farmers who identified their farm allows us to identify these present farmers’ names and 
for how long previous farm owners shared the same surname. This in turn allows us to infer 
since when the respective farm was in family possession.
6 Comparing the year since when a 
farm was in family possession with the year of birth of the present farmer, we can infer 
whether the farmer grew up on his farm or whether he acquired it at some later stage.  
Precipitation data 
Actual precipitation data from the Namibia Meteorological Service is available for the period 
1913–2008. However, these data are collected at only few weather stations across Namibia 
and the time series has many gaps. Instead, we use simulated precipitation data for our 
analysis. This data was generated by the three-dimensional, hydrostatic atmospheric 
circulation model REMO (REgional MOdel) (Jacob and Podzun, 1997; Jacob, 2001). The 
model is forced at the lateral boundaries with historical climate data and with output from the 
global climate model ECHAM4 (Roeckner et al., 1996) every six simulated hours. REMO 
                                                 
6 There is a chance that transferors and transferees share the same surname even though they are not related. 
However, diversity of surnames among Namibian cattle farmers is high. Even when considering the most 
common surnames, there are never more than 19 individuals per surname in our survey population. Given the 
size of the survey population (1,916 farmers), the chance of transferor and transferee sharing the same surname 
even though they are not related is less than 1%.  
9data is available for the period 1978–2008. We use output data of REMO with a temporal 
resolution of six hours and a spatial resolution of 18km * 18km to calculate total precipitation 
per rainy season (November till April) for individual farms as a weighted mean over nine 
adjacent model gridboxes. This simulated data closely conforms to actual precipitation data in 
respect to the precipitation risk measure we employ. We discuss this at greater length in 
Section 3.3 where we detail the risk measure.  
Input and output price data 
Prices for inputs are temporally variable, but homogenous across farmers since all commercial 
farmers essentially trade with the same companies. Farmers produce two main outputs which 
are cattle sold to the slaughterhouse for meat production and cattle sold at auctions for further 
rearing by other farmers. Prices for the first output are also homogenous across farmers for 
the same reason cited under input prices.
7 We thus will not consider price risks of inputs and 
of cattle sold to the slaughterhouse as they may not explain individual differences in behavior.  
In contrast, output prices for cattle sales at local auction may be spatially heterogeneous and 
this also across farmers since cattle are typically sold at auctions close to the farm. To 
examine this risk, we obtained price data for cattle sales on 2,083 commercial auctions across 
Namibia for the period 2000–2008 from Agra Co-operative Ltd, the largest retailer for farm 
equipment in Namibia and organizer of almost all cattle auctions. Data contain the location of 
auctions, the auction date, the number of sold cattle with average weight and average price per 
head and per kilogram.  
3.2 Confounding influence of precipitation and price risk as background risks 
In the risk experiments it was not feasible to elicit farmer’s risk preferences by experimentally 
varying precipitation risk, our primary risk of interest. We were therefore relegated to 
introduce an additional, artificial risk in the experiments and to examine endogeneity of 
preferences and self-selection in respect to precipitation risk by way of controlling for these 
two mechanisms. The downside of this approach is that it induces precipitation risk to 
constrain choices in the risk experiment by acting as a background risk. Thus, we now 
simultaneously deal with three mechanisms by which precipitation risk may act on risk 
preferences: endogeneity of preferences, self-selection and background risk. In addition to 
                                                 
7 Inputs are purchased from Agra Co-operative Ltd. as well as from a few companies who distribute specialized 
products (de Bryn et al., 2007). All these companies have nationally homogeneous prices. In regards to outputs, 
95% of cattle sold to the slaughterhouse are sold to MeatCo in the 2007, the latest available record (MAWF, 
2009). 
10precipitation risk, farmers also face a cattle price risk which likewise acts as a background 
risk to choices in the risk experiment. 
The background risks may thereby counfound our inferences on the occurrence of 
endogeneity of preferences and self-selection. To better pinpoint confounding influences we 
propose the following two-stage process in which the different mechanisms may act: 
  first stage, before the risk experiments:  
i) endogeneity of preferences where precipitation risk form risk preferences contingent 
on life history 
ii) self-selection where farmers sort themselves, ceteris paribus, into local 
precipitation risk according to their risk preferences, and 
  second stage, in the risk experiments:  
iii) precipitation background risk where the previously chosen local precipitation risk 
now acts as a constraint to choices in experiment with the artificial risk 
iv) price background risk where the local cattle price risk acts as an additional 
constraint 
We will be able to adequately control for endogeneity of preferences with respect to 
precipitation risk by examining different subpopulations (methodically resolved by an 
interaction effect, cf. Section 3.3). Statements about this mechanism will therefore not be 
confounded by the presence of precipitation background risk. However, we cannot separately 
control for self-selection and precipitation background risk since the relevant variable, local 
precipitation risk, measures both mechanisms simultaneously. Thus, the measure of risk 
aversion we elicited is in this respect not a “pure” preferences parameter but instead a 
preferences parameter plus a confounding influence of the background risk constraint.  
Does such a confounding influence of precipitation background risk preclude an interpretation 
of the relationship between risk preferences and risk as being the result of self-selection? 
Theoretical (Eeckhoudt et al., 1996), experimental (Harrison et al., 2007b) and field findings 
(Guiso and Paiella, 2008) suggest a positive relationship between risk aversion and 
background risk, at least when utility functions are characterized by non-increasing prudence, 
as is the case for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) utility functions. If this holds indeed, the impact of background risk on risk aversion 
is of opposite sign to the proposed negative impact of self-selection (Guiso and Paiella, 2008; 
Jaeger et al., 2010). Assuming these relationships to also hold for our study, a positive impact 
11of local precipitation risk on risk aversion would then indicate a background risk mechanism 
with an unclear contribution of self-selection while a negative impact would indicate self-
selection with an unclear contribution of background risk. Thus, while it is impossible in our 
experimental setup to make statements on both self-selection and background risk 
simultaneously, we may – contingent on finding a significant non-zero impact – make at least 
unambiguous statements in respect to one of these mechanisms. 
In regards to the price background risk of cattle sold at auctions we find that prices between 
auction locations are highly correlated with Pearson correlation coefficients being no smaller 
than 0.97 and significant at the 0.1%-level for correlation between any two locations.
8 Thus, 
this price background risk is effectively identical for all farmers. Similar to prices for inputs 
and cattle sold to the slaughterhouse it may not explain individual differences in behavior, and 
we do not consider in the further course of the paper. 
3.3 Statistical specification 
Risk measure 
We employ the definition of risk developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) where a given 
distribution in precipitation is more risky in respect to another distribution if it is a mean 
preserving spread of said latter distribution. If distributions are log-normal, a mean-preserving 
spread is equivalent to a higher coefficient of variation (CV) for a given mean (Levy, 2006).  
Rainfall in Namibia is log-normally distributed (Sandford, 1982).
9 To measure precipitation 
risk, we employ the inter-annual coefficient of variation (CV) of total rainy season 
precipitation while controlling for the inter-annual mean of total rainy season precipitation. 
Thus, if the CV of rainfall is higher on farm A than on farm B, where mean rainfall is the 
same, precipitation on farm A is more risky as the distribution can be described by a mean-
preserving spread of the distribution of rainfall on farm B. Analytically, this translates into 
precipitation risk being measured by the CV while controlling for the mean with a riskier 
distribution being characterized by a higher CV for a given mean.  
We calculate the inter-annual CV and mean of total rainy season precipitation for individual 
farms from REMO data. Furthermore, as we are interested in the precipitation risk that 
                                                 
8 The reason is that a small number of buyers purchase the majority of cattle sold on auctions (Schutz, 2010). 
9 We also tested all distributions of total rainy season precipitation that were simulated by the REMO model and 
that we use in our analysis for log-normality using the Shapiro-Wilk-W test. The hypothesis of log-normality 
cannot be rejected for the vast majority (95 out of 99) of distributions at the 5%-level. We thus treated all 
distributions as log-normal. 
12individual farmers have experienced we only use the precipitation data of the period that a 
given farmer was present on the farm for the calculation of the risk. For some farmers this 
period is longer than the period of 1978–2008 for which REMO data is available. However, 
the precipitation risk over this longer period is well approximated by the risk over the period 
1978–2008, and we use the risk measure calculated for the period 1978-2008 as a proxy for 
the risk of all longer periods.
10 Since CV estimates fluctuate wildly if based on only few 
observations we require that farmers lived on their farm for at least three years prior to the 
survey in order to be included in the analysis. We limit our analysis to risk-averse individuals 
and the risk measure is thus available for all farmers that are risk-averse, indicated their farm 
location and lived on the farm for at least three years.  
Finally, we validate risk measures calculated from simulated data with the corresponding risk 
measures calculated from actual data by matching REMO data with data for the nearest 
weather station of the Namibia Meteorological Service (requiring a distance of less than 
5km). Measures are highly correlated between both data sets and significant at the 0.1%-level, 
with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.76 (p<0.001, n = 26) and 0.74 (p<0.001, n = 26) for 
CV and mean, respectively. We thus conclude that simulated data closely conform to actual 
precipitation data in respect to our risk measure. 
Socio-demographics, experimental type and life history 
We control for various socio-demographic variables: gender, education (no college or 
apprenticeship education), area of rangeland (as a proxy for wealth), ownership structure 
(farm owned by multiple individuals, e.g. by corporations, cooperatives or trusts), living on 
farm (as a proxy for full-time farming versus part-time farming) and liquidity constraint 
(measured as the importance of loans for farm business operation, where more reliance on 
loans implies more liquidity constraint).
11 We represent life history by a continuous variable 
that denotes the number of years farmers have spent on their farm prior to adulthood, i.e. prior 
                                                 
10 We exemplarily analyzed actual rainfall data from the Namibia Meteorological Service to investigate how 
closely the risk measure derived from the period 1978–2008 conforms to the measure derived from the period 
1930 (the year of birth of the oldest farmer included in our analyses) –2008. We chose all those stations for 
which at least 10 observations for total rainy season precipitation were available in both the periods 1930–1978 
and 1978–2008, which applies to 79 stations, and calculate the respective risk measures. Pearson correlation 
coefficients are 0.93 (p<0.001) and 0.98 (p<0.001) for the CV and mean, respectively. We conclude that the risk 
measure derived from the period 1978–2008 can serve as a proxy for the risk measure of the period 1930–2008 
as well as for all other periods Z –2008 where Z is an integer in the interval [1930, 1978].   
11 Two commonly used socio-demographic control variables, age and ethnicity, are not included in our analyses. 
We ran specifications with these variables but found that they were not significant and that their inclusion did 
not change our results. In order to avoid over-specification we tried to use as few control variables as possible 
and consequently excluded both age and ethnicity. 
13to age 18 years.
12 The idea behind this approach is that we may indicate how long farmers 
could have experienced the precipitation risk on their farm during childhood and adolescence. 
Finally, we also include an experimental control variable (questionnaire versus field 
experiments). Table 2 lists the respective variables with sample means, standard deviation and 
range.  
Maximum likelihood specification 
In our econometric specification of the expected utility function we follow the approach 
applied in previous studies in semi-arid areas by (Harrison et al., 2010) and which is detailed 
in (Harrison, 2008). The expected utility of the lottery, i.e. the auction in the questionnaire 
experiments and simply the lottery in the field experiments, is defined as 
11 22 () ()
L EU pU y p U y          ( 3 )  
where p1 and y1  denote the probability and payoff for outcome 1, p2 and y2 denote probability 
and payoff for outcome 2. Since probabilities and incomes were the same for all scenarios, it 
follows for the questionnaire experiments that 
0.5 ( $90,000) 0.5 ( $130,000)
L E U UN UN        (4) 
and for the field experiments that 
0.5 ( $500) 0.5 ( $2,500)
L E U UN UN    .     (5) 
The expected utility for income from the certain amount is defined accordingly. Since this 
income is certain, the expected utility function reduces to EU
C
i = U(yci) where yci is the certain 
income for scenario i from the trader in the questionnaire experiments and the certain payout 
in the field experiments, respectively. Here, i as an index for the scenario (i=1,…,6 in the 
questionnaire experiment and i=1,…,16 in the field experiment). 
We think of individuals as assessing the difference between expected utility derived from the 
lottery and the utility derived from the certain payoff when making their choices. They may, 
however, perform a processing error when evaluating the alternatives. This error can be 
specified as a Fechner error which is an additive error term that is normally distributed with 
mean zero and standard deviation (Fechner, 1860/1966; Hey and Orme, 1994; Loomes and 




i +      
                                                 
12 We assume that farmers stayed on the farm ever since it came into family possession or since he acquired it. 
14Employing maximum likelihood estimation, we estimate the constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA)-coefficient r and the Fechner error’s standard deviation  as parameters of a log-
likelihood function.
13 This estimation assumes a cumulative standard normal distribution  
defined over EU difference for the observed choices in each scenario. Thus, the log-likelihood 
function, conditional on the expected utility model and our CRRA specification being true, as 















X z r L ) 0 | )) ( 1 (ln( ) 1 | )) ( (ln( ) , ; , ( ln
 
   (7) 
where zi = 1 (0) denotes whether the subject choses the lottery (certain income) in scenario i 
and X is a vector of determinants. Due to an experimental artifact (many farmers indicated 
extreme responses) we did not include the responses of all farmers in the analysis. This 
artifact and our process of exclusion are described in detail in Appendix A.2. 
We model r as a linear function of the determinants and assume that is influenced by 
gender. We may then analyze the hypothesis that precipitation risk influences farmers 
differently contingent on life history through an interaction effect between risk and life 
history. The estimate r ^ of r is 
r ^ =  r ^o  + r ^MEAN · MEAN + r ^CV · CV + r ^YFPA18 · YFPA18 + r ^CV × YFPA18 · (CV × YFPA18)  
+ r ^X · X                   (8) 
  
where MEAN is the inter-annual mean of total rainy season precipitation, CV the respective 
coefficient of variation which captures the precipitation risk, YFPA18  the continuous life 
history variable denoting the number of years spent on the present farm prior to age 18 years, 
CV X YFPA18 the interaction between risk and life history, and X a vector of control variables 
(see Table 2). We are interested in the value not only of the coefficients, but also of the 
constant r ^o.. In order to interpret it as the CRRA of the “typical” farmer (contingent on the 
chosen independent variables) we define binary variables in such way that the value zero 
indicates the most frequent category. We redefine continuous independent variables by 
subtracting their respective means. Thus, for redefined continuous variables the value zero 
now represents the sample average. We did not redefine the life history variable because the 
                                                 
13 Harrison et al. (2007b) discuss in detail why the estimation of the Fechner error reduces to estimating  
15value zero is of special importance as it indicates those farmers who did not grow up on their 
farm.
14 
Finally, we assume that a farmer’s responses in different scenarios are correlated, i.e. that the 
choice in one scenario is not independent of those in the other scenarios. We thus correct the 
standard errors by clustering all the responses for a single farmer. By doing so we effectively 
create a panel which is stratified by farmers. 
4. Results 
We present our results in the form of three different model specifications which employ 
samples of different sizes and composition (Table 3). Specification (1) includes only the 
socio-demographic and experimental control variables, but not the risk and life history 
variables. The sample for this specification consists of 1868 choices by 210 farmers. 
Specification (2) additionally includes the risk and life history variables, and Specification (3) 
the interaction effect between both variables. The sample for the latter two specifications is 
restricted to 994 choices by 99 farmers since we exclude farmers that were not risk-averse, 
did not reveal their farm location, lived on the farm for fewer than three years, or for whom 
we could not identified since when they lived on their present farm. We begin our discussion 
with findings on the causal mechanisms between risk preferences and precipitation risk, 
proceed with findings on the impact of socio-demographic and experiment control variables 
and close with robustness checks. 
4.1 Causal mechanisms between risk preferences and precipitation risk 
Both Specifications (2) and (3) indicate that risk preferences are significantly related to local 
precipitation risk. Specification (3), which we will discuss unless otherwise noted, indicates 
that the relationship is additionally contingent on life history: the total effect of risk on risk 
aversion constitutes of a significant main effect of risk and a significant interaction effect 
between risk and life history. The main effect is negative, with CRRA decreasing by 0.732 
per unit of inter-annual CV of total rainy season precipitation. The interaction effect is 
positive where each year spent on the farm prior to age 18 years increases the total effect of 
risk on CRRA by 0.081. While it does not concern the relationship between risk preferences 
and risk, we note for completeness sake that the main effect of life history on risk aversion is 
                                                 
14 If we define the life history variable in such a way, then the interaction effect between risk and life history is 
likewise zero for farmers who did not grow up on the farm. We will use this property in the discussion of our 
results (cf. Section 4.1). 
16small but likewise significant, with CRRA decreasing by 0.003 for each year spent on the 
farm prior to age 18 years. 
To examine which causal mechanisms are at play it is helpful to discriminate between two 
subpopulations of farmers. The first subpopulation consists of farmers who did not grow up 
on their farm, i.e. who came to the farm as adults. For them, the total effect equals the main 
effect as YFPA18 is zero (i.e. they have spent no year on their farm prior to age 18 years) and 
consequently also the interaction effect. These farmers are less risk averse under higher 
precipitation risk. The second subpopulation consist of farmers who grew up on their farm for 
at least one year prior to age 18 years and for whom YFPA18 and the interaction effect are 
positive. For them, the total effect is less negative than the main effect as the positive 
interaction effect (partly) offsets the negative main effect. For a given precipitation risk, those 
farmers are more risk averse than farmers who did not grow up on their farm, and the shift 
towards risk aversion is larger the longer they have experienced the risk during childhood and 
adolescence. For farmers of this second subpopulation who have spent less than 10 years on 
their farm prior to age 18 years, the total effect remains negative as the interaction effect 
offsets the main effect only partially. They are still less risk averse under higher precipitation 
risk. In contrast, for farmers of who have spent (at least) 10 years on their farm prior to age 18 
years the total effect becomes positive: the interaction effect then amounts to (at least) 0.81 
and completely offsets the main effect of -0.732. They are more risk averse under higher 
precipitation risk. 
Endogeneity of risk preferences 
We hypothesize in Section 2.1 that risk preferences are endogenous with respect to 
precipitation risk experienced during childhood and adolescence and that formation of 
preferences is stronger the longer farmers have experienced this risk. We have no information 
on early-life experience of risk for the first subpopulation of farmers who did not grow up on 
their farm. However, we do have such information for the second subpopulation of farmers 
who grew up on their farms as they have already experienced the present risk. For them, our 
estimation results support our hypothesis: the interaction effect is non-zero and the total effect 
of risk on risk aversion consequently contingent on YFPA18. Thus, the relationship between 
risk preferences and risk changes with experiences of this risk during childhood and 
adolescence, and the change is more profound the longer this risk was experienced.
15  
                                                 
15 We exclude the possibility of reverse causality, i.e. risk aversion impacting on precipitation risk as 
precipitation is exogenous to the actions of the individual farmer during his lifetime. 
17We may interpret the positive sign of the interaction effect, i.e. that risk aversion is increasing 
with early-life experience of a risk, as a more general indication that experience with adverse 
conditions results in more risk averse behavior. In this regard, our observations are in line 
with those of Malmendier and Nagel (2011) who observe more risk averse behavior for stock 
and bond market investors who have experienced worse macro-economic conditions. We 
differ from their study in our interpretation of the results. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) 
propose endogeneity of risk beliefs as the causal mechanism. In contrast, we assume that 
farmers’ subjective beliefs about the precipitation distributions conform to the objective 
distribution. Thus, we rule out endogeneity of beliefs as a possible explanation and instead 
propose endogeneity of risk preferences.
16 However, our results do not conform to those by 
Voors et al. (2011) who find that adverse experience of civil war shocks makes people more 
risk averse. 
Self-selection 
Based on the farm market model we formulate in Equations (1) and (2) we hypothesize that 
farmers self-select themselves according to risk preferences with more risk averse farmers 
operating on less risky farms. Our estimation results for the first subpopulation of farmers 
who did not grow up on their farm support this hypothesis: the total effect is negative and 
equal to the main effect of -0.732. Thus, within this subpopulation farmers are indeed less risk 
averse under higher precipitation risk. This results also conforms to previous findings, e.g. on 
choice of occupations with risky income (e.g. Bellemare and Shearer, 2010) or investment 
portfolios (e.g. Guiso and Paiella, 2005), that explained an observed negative relationship 
between risk aversion and riskiness of prospects by self-selection. 
Precipitation background risk 
Finally, we note in Section 3.2 that precipitation risk may act as a background risk. In contrast 
to endogeneity of preferences, we cannot control for this separately. The main effect of risk 
on risk aversion may thus reflect both self-selection and precipitation risk acting as a 
background risk. We therefore have to consider whether precipitation background risk may 
confound our findings on self-selection. 
Consider three cases. In the first case, precipitation risk does not act as a background risk. 
Then our estimate of -0.732 for the main effect solely reflects self-selection. In the second 
                                                 
16 Similarly, even though Malmendier and Nagel (2011) propose endogeneity of beliefs as the underlying 
mechanism, they cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity of preferences occurring simultaneously. 
18case, precipitation risk acts as a background risk and impacts positively on risk aversion, i.e. 
in the opposite direction of self-selection. Then we can only estimate a negative coefficient 
for the main effect if the positive effect due to precipitation background risk is completely 
offset by a considerably larger and negative effect due to self-selection. In the third case, 
precipitation risk again acts as a background risk but now impacts negatively on risk aversion, 
i.e. in the same direction as self-selection. Then we can make no statement on whether only 
self-selection, only background risk, both or neither are causal mechanisms that explain the 
negative impact of risk on risk aversion. 
Based on previous literature findings (cf. Section 3.2), we can exclude the third case. That still 
leaves the first two cases and it is not possible to state which of either is true. We therefore 
cannot make any statement on whether precipitation risk is indeed acting as a background 
risk. However, we can state that the observed negative relationship between risk aversion and 
risk is at least partly due to self-selection. Thus, contingent on literature findings being true, 
the possibility of precipitation risk acting as a background risk does not confound our findings 
on self-selection.  
Price background risks and liquidity constraint 
Finally, we note that our results are neither confounded by price background risks or by 
liquidity constraint. As aforementioned, the price risks are homogenous across farmers and 
cannot explain individual differences in behavior. Liquidity constraint is heterogeneous across 
famers but do not impact on risk aversion as the coefficient is with -0.005 small and not 
significant.  
4.2 Constant, socio-demographic and experimental control variables 
Results on the socio-demographic and experimental control variables are identical in regards 
to sign and similar in regards to magnitude and significance for Specifications (2) and (3) All 
estimates that are significant in Specification (1) are also significant in Specifications (2) and 
(3), but absolute values of the constant and almost all variables are higher in the latter two 
specifications. At least for the constant, this is due to exclusion of risk attracted farmers. 
Finally, gender is significant only in Specifications (2) and (3). In the further course, unless 
otherwise noted, we will discuss the constant and control variables exemplarily for 
Specification (1). 
We find that the “typical” farmer is risk-averse with a CRRA-coefficient of 0.975 (Table 3). 
This value is close to the 0.951 reported for field experiments with American coin collectors 
19by Harrison et al. (2007b) who employ the same utility function and error specification. The 
Fechner error is not significant and only marginally different from zero. If we rerun the 
analysis without independent variables and error specification, we estimate a CRRA-
coefficient of 0.779 (1950 choices by 221 farmers, p<0.001).
17 Thus, risk aversion for the 
“typical” farmer is confirmed over alternative model specifications, and this agrees with 
findings from other studies in semi-arid areas, such as Binswanger (1980) for India, Nielsen 
(2001) for Madagascar, Wik et al. (2004) for Zambia, Bezabih (2009) for Ethiopia, Yesuf and 
Bluffstone (2009) for Ethiopia and Harrison et al. (2010) for Ethiopia, India and Uganda).  
Specifications (2) and (3), but not Specification (1), show that female farmers are less risk 
averse than male farmers with CRRA being lower by 0.313 and 0.342, respectively. This 
result echoes what Harrison et al. (2010) found in India, Uganda and Ethiopia, but is at odds 
with other results from semi-arid regions (e.g. Wik et al., 2004). Low education is positively 
related to risk aversion with an increase in CRRA by 0.04, and these findings are in 
accordance with, for example, Binswanger (1980). Farmers who operate in some form of joint 
ownership are with 0.024 units CRRA significantly less risk averse than farmers who are 
single owners. Area of rangeland is not related to risk aversion which is in contrast to Yesuf 
and Bluffstone (2009) who find a negative relationship. Likewise, part-time farming and 
liquidity constraint do not significantly affects risk aversion. Altogether, comparing the 
relationship between risk preferences and socio-demographic variables across studies does not 
reveal a clear picture on the sign of many of these variables. Our findings are thus best viewed 
in the specific context of commercial cattle farming in Namibia. 
Turing to the experimental control variable we find that choices in field experiments (which 
involve real payouts) are associated with an increase in risk aversion by 0.395. One possible 
explanation for this difference is the payout level, which was almost 75 times higher in field 
experiments than in questionnaire experiments. This would imply globally decreasing relative 
risk-aversion (DRRA) in contradiction to our CRRA assumption. However, the observed 
difference in risk aversion may also be due to payout structure, i.e. real payouts in field 
experiments and hypothetical payouts in questionnaire experiments, or framing, i.e. the 
number of scenarios, elicitation procedure and the specific context in which the experiments 
were phrased. In regards to payout structure, Holt and Laudry (2002) reported subjects 
                                                 
17 This coefficient is higher than values reported from other field studies that assume the same utility function 
and no error specification, but not out of range of values that can be found in laboratory experiments. For 
example, Harrison et al. (2010) find a CRRA-coefficient of 0.536 in a field study in India, Uganda and Ethiopia, 
and Harrison et al. (2007a) a coefficient of 0.67 in a field study in Denmark, while Andersen et al. (2006) 
reported a value of 0.79 for laboratory experiments in Denmark. 
20behaved more risk-averse when confronted with real instead of hypothetical payouts. In 
regards to framing, Harrison et al. (2007b) found the CRRA-estimate differs by up to 0.756 
across frames. In the light of this finding, the difference between CRRA between field and 
questionnaire experiments is reasonably small. Altogether, our finding that the CRRA-
coefficient is sensitive to experimental type is unsurprising, but the exact reason remains 
elusive since our experiments were not designed to clarify this aspect. We maintain the 
assumption that CRRA holds at least locally for a given income domain. Both lab and field 
studies have shown this to be a plausible assumption (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison et 
al., 2007a).  
4.3 Robustness check 
In order to ensure that our results in Section 4.1 are not driven by certain assumptions or 
model specifications we perform robustness checks. We briefly summarize these checks here 
while we treat them at length in Appendix A.3 and A.4. 
Life history as a binary variable 
Our results on endogeneity of preferences may depend on the way we code life history. In this 
robustness check (Appendix A.3), we code life history not as a continuous variable as in 
Specification (3), but instead as a binary variable that indicates whether farmers were present 
on their farm at a certain threshold age. We estimate three separate specifications in which we 
vary the threshold age. In the first, we set the threshold to age 0 years. The binary variable 
then indicates whether farmers were born on their farm. In the second and third we set the 
threshold to age 9 years and age 18 years, respectively, to indicate farmers who lived already 
on their farm at age 9 years and 18 years. 
Estimating these alternative specification we find that the main effect of risk on risk aversion 
is negative, while the interaction effect is positive and increases if farmers have spent more 
time on their farm during childhood and adolescence (i.e. if we lower the age threshold in the 
binary life history variable). Thus, using these alternative specifications we again find 
evidence for endogeneity of preferences and self-selection acting as causal mechanisms. 
Heterogeneous time preferences 
According to the farm market model in Equations (1) and (2) time preference in the form of a 
discount rate influences the bids farmers are willing to offer for a farm and thus ultimately 
self-selection onto farms. We assume in the previous analysis that time preferences are 
homogenous across farmers. However, we elicited time preferences along with risk 
21preferences in the survey. We did not include them before due to an experimental artifact akin 
to what we described for risk experiments in Appendix A.2 which invalidates elicited data 
from time experiments for 32% of farmers. As a consequence, if we control for time 
preferences the number of farmers over which results are estimated decreases to only 79.  
In this robustness check we include time preference as an additive control variable in the form 
of a time preference index (Appendix A.4). Estimation yields qualitatively the same results as 
in Specification (3): coefficients remain in the same order of magnitude and retain the sign, 
and significant (insignificant) coefficients remain significant (insignificant). The index itself 
is significant at the 1%-level and has a coefficient of -0.027. Thus, the parsimonious model 
we estimate in Specification (3) adequately captures the relationship between risk preferences 
and risk. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We find evidence that suggests that more risk averse farmers operate less risky farms. We 
have shown that this finding may be explained by a farm market that allocates farms to 
farmers according to their risk preferences. Even for farmers who never purchased a farm (i.e. 
who grew up on their farm) we observe evidence suggesting self-selection. More importantly, 
our analysis also shows that risk preferences endogenously depend on early-life experience 
with environmental risk. Finally, if early-life experience with environmental risk is long 
enough, endogeneity becomes the dominating mechanism for the relationship between risk 
preferences and risk. Our above results are robust to alternative model specifications and are 
not confounded by precipitation risk acting as a background risk, by price background risks or 
by liquidity constraint.  
Our results have general implications since risk preferences play a fundamental role in 
economic theory. For example, Harsanyi (1953; 1955; 1977) justifies the Utilitarian social 
welfare function based on an argument where an impartial observer chooses social states 
behind a veil of ignorance according to von-Neumann-Morgenstern risk preferences. 
Endogeneity of risk preferences imposes an obvious challenge to this type of argument. 
Our results also have specific implications for the management of ecosystems in the context 
of climate change. Climate change is considered to entail an increase in environmental risks, 
such as of fires, floods or droughts, which already affect many regions worldwide (Schneider 
et al., 2007). This alters peoples’ opportunity sets and – given risk aversion – would, ceteris 
paribus, increase the demand for insurance against environmental risks. According to our 
22results, however, an increase in experienced environmental risk might make future 
generations ever more risk averse which additionally increases insurance demand. Thus, 
development of well-functioning insurance markets in developing regions may become even 
more important in the coming decades. 
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Figure 1: Precipitation risk in Namibia and study area. Shading denotes interannual coefficient of variation of 
total rainy season precipitation for the period 1978-2008, as calculated by the Regional Model (REMO). 
Crosses depict locations of those surveyed farms that were included in Specifications (2) and (3). Dashed 
lines indicates main commercial cattle farming area as adapted from Mendelsohn (2006), p. 43. 
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a) Questionnaire experiments 
 
Context provided in the questionnaire:  
 
“In the following question, we would like you to respond to a hypothetical situation.  
Let’s assume you are forced to sell fifty weaners (due to financial or grazing reasons) and can do so at auction. 
However, you are uncertain about the amount of money they will fetch. You have a 50% chance that the fifty 
weaners combined will fetch N$ 90 000 and a 50% chance that they will fetch N$ 130 000. 
Instead of selling at auction, you can sell the weaners to a reputable trader for a fixed amount of money. The 
trade procedures (i.e. driving to the venue, paperwork, etc.) are similar regardless of whether you sell at 
auction or to the trader.  
For each of the following six scenarios, please choose whether you prefer to take part in the auction having a 
50% chance of fetching either N$ 90 000 or N$ 130 000, or prefer to sell to the trader offering you increasing 
higher amounts of money. 
 Please check only one box for each of the six scenarios.” 
 
Scenario Lottery  Certain  amount 
  Outcome 1  Outcome 2   
1  N$ 90,000; ½  N$ 130,000; ½  N$ 100,000 
2  N$ 90,000; ½  N$ 130,000; ½  N$ 102,500 
3  N$ 90,000; ½  N$ 130,000; ½  N$ 105,000 
4  N$ 90,000; ½  N$ 130,000; ½  N$ 107,500 
5  N$ 90,000; ½  N$ 130,000; ½  N$ 110,000 
6  N$ 90,000; ½  N$ 130,000; ½  N$ 112,500 
 
b) Field experiments 
 
No specific context provided. 
 
Scenario Lottery  Certain  amount 
  Outcome 1  Outcome 2   
1  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 550 
2  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 600 
3  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 650 
4  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 700 
5  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 800 
6  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 900 
7  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,000 
8  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,100 
9  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,200 
10  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,300 
11  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,400 
12  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,500 
13  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,600 
14  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,700 
15  N$ 500; ½  N$ 2,500; ½  N$ 1,800 





Table 1: Experimental design for risk preference elicitation: a) questionnaire experiments, b) field experiments. 
29Table 2: Variable list and descriptive statistics for Specifications (2) to (3). N = 99. 





          
Real payout  Participation in field experiment with real 
payout 
0.25 0.44  0  1 
Female Female  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Low education  No college or apprenticeship education  0.18  0.39  0  1 
Area of rangeland  Area of rangeland in hectares  7,952  4,693  0  26,000 
Multiple owners  Farm owned by a more than one individual  0.32  0.47  0  1 
Living off-farm  Living off farm during the week, proxy for part-
time farming 
0.21 0.41  0  1 
Liquidity constraint  Self-reported liquidity constraint, measured as 
importance of loans for farm business operation 
on a six-item Likert scale where higher values 
indicate more liquidity constraint 
2.92 1.63  1  6 
YFPA18  Number of years farmers have spent on their 
farm prior to age 18 years 
8.19 8.56  0  18 
Mean of precipitation  Inter-annual mean of total rainy season 
precipitation in mm 
286.9 85.3 67.4  508.6 
CV of precipitation  Inter-annual coefficient of variation (CV) of 
total rainy season precipitation 
0.29 0.04 0.22  0.47 
CV x YFPA18  Interaction effect between CV of precipitation 
and YFPA18 






















30Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimation of coefficient of relative risk-aversion (r) and Fechner error ( for 
three different model specifications (1, 2, 3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** 







Parameter Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
r Constant  0.975***  1.370***  1.382*** 
   (0.104)  (0.133)  (0.124) 
 Real  payout  0.395***  0.661***  0.672*** 
   (0.075)  (0.110)  (0.106) 
 Female  0.070  –0.313***  –0.342*** 
   (0.067)  (0.115)  (0.116) 
 Low  education  0.040**  0.057**  0.069** 
   (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
 Area  of  rangeland  –0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 Multiple  owners  –0.024*  –0.059**  –0.067*** 
   (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
 Living  off-farm –0.026  –0.048  –0.043 
   (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.029) 
 Liquidity  constraint  0.001  –0.001  –0.005 
   (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
 YFPA18    –0.004**  –0.003** 
     (0.001)  (0.001) 
  Mean of precipitation    0.000  0.000 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
 CV  of  precipitation    –0.492*  –0.732** 
     (0.266)  (0.286) 
  CV x YFPA18      0.081** 
       (0.038) 
 Female –0.024  0.002  0.002 
   (0.032)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 Constant  0.033  0.000  0.000 
   (0.039)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 Log-likelihood  –659.2  –324.6  –321.4 
 Chi-square  44.84  61.07  67.67 
 Model  significance  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Observations  1,868  994  994 
 Clusters  by  individual  210  99  99 
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A.1. Bids on the land market  
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Solving for   leads to (2).  
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  which proves the proposition. 
A.2 Elimination of experimental artifacts 
About one quarter (23.4%) of farmers who mailed in questionnaires never or always chose the 
lottery in the questionnaire experiment, i.e. they made choices that characterize them as 
extremely risk averse or extremely risk attracted. Such a pattern was not apparent for those 39 
farmers that completed the questionnaire experiment in the presence of a researcher (during 
our experimental sessions) where only 17.5% never or always chose the lottery. A two sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions reveal significant differences between 
both groups (p=0.032). In the sessions where a researcher was present we observed that it 
frequently took farmers a long time to complete the hypothetical risk experiment in the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, after having filled in the questionnaire some of those farmers who 
were characterized as extremely risk averse or extremely risk attracted remarked that they had 
a personal dislike for selling at auctions or to a trader, respectively. 
Based on these observations, we consider the extreme responses of those farmers who mailed-
in questionnaires likely to be experimental artifacts that do not reflect risk taking behavior. 
We therefore exclude these farmers in our analyses. After exclusion, a two sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is no longer significant (p=0.332). The above described maximum 
likelihood-estimation is thus at the tails defined only over responses from the 39 experimental 
participants for which we are certain that they indicated risk taking behavior. 
A.3. Robustness check: life history as a binary variable 
In Specification (3) we examine for endogeneity of risk preferences by coding life history as 
the continuous variable YFPA18 and by calculating the interaction effect with precipitation 
risk. In this robustness check, we code life history as the binary variable GREWUP which 
indicates whether farmers lived already on their farm at a certain threshold age (GREWUP = 1) 
or not (GREWUP = 0). We then calculate the interaction effect between the precipitation risk 
farmers have experienced and GREWUP accordingly and estimate the model:  
r ^ = r ^o   + r ^MEAN · MEAN + r ^CV · CV + r ^GREWUP · GREWUP + r ^CV × GREWUP · (CV × GREWUP)  
+ r ^X ·X                           ( 9 )  
where GREWUP is the binary life history variable and CV × GREWUP the interaction effect 
between precipitation risk and life history. Estimation results obviously depend on the precise 
value we select for the threshold age of GREWUP. We exemplarily report below estimations 
33for the three values 0, 9 and 18 years, but we arrive at the same qualitative results if we 
choose other values in the interval [0 years, 18 years]. Accordingly, in Specification (4) we 
set the threshold age to 0 years. GREWUP then indicates whether farmers were born on their 
farm. In Specification (5) and (6) we set the threshold to 9 years and 18 years, respectively, to 
indicate farmers who lived already on their farm at age 9 years and age 18 years.  
Estimation results show that the main effect of risk on risk aversion is significant, negative 
and similar between Specifications (4) to (6) with a value between -0.531 and -0.718 (Table 
4). The interaction effect is positive in all specifications, but significant only in the first two. 
Its value decreases from 1.696 to 1.303 and 0.360 in Specifications (4), (5) and (6), 
respectively.  
These results confirm our previous findings on endogeneity of preferences. The positive 
interaction effect indicates that, for a given risk, farmers who grew up on their farm are more 
risk averse than those who did not grow up on their farm. Furthermore, the interaction effect 
is larger in magnitude the lower we set the age threshold, indicating that the relationship 
between risk aversion and risk is impacted on more strongly the longer farmers have 
experienced the risk. Finally, the interaction effect is no longer significant if we set the 
threshold age to 18 years, suggesting that risk must be experienced in early life in order to 
form preferences.  
The results also confirm our finding on self-selection. For the subpopulation of farmers whom 
we designated as not having grown on their farm, i.e. for whom GREWUP and the interaction 
effect take on the value zero, the total effect of risk on risk aversion equals the negative main 
effect. In Specification (6), the composition of this subpopulation corresponds to that in 
Specification (3), i.e. comprises of farmers who came to the farm at age 18 years or old and 
thus presumably by their own choice. Thus, the negative relationship between risk aversion 
and risk suggests self-selection according to risk preferences. In Specification (5) and (4) the 
composition is different: farmers designated as not having grown up on their farm comprise 
all farmers who came to the farm of their own choice as well as those who came there with 
their parents between age 10 to 18 years and age 1 to 18 years, respectively. The negative 
relationship suggests self-selection even if farmers are included who never changed farms on 
their on choice.  
Altogether, results in this alternative approach with a binary life history variable confirms our 
previous finding on endogeneity of preferences and self-selection that we estimated with a 
34continuous life history variable. These previous findings are thus not sensitive to the concrete 
model specification we employed in Specification (3).  
 A.4. Robustness check: heterogeneous time preferences 
Correspondingly to the elicitation of risk preferences, we elicited time preferences by a 
multiple price list format with hypothetical payouts, as detailed in Olbrich et al. (2009). In a 
context free frame, farmers had to choose in five scenarios between receiving a payment in 
one month or a higher payment in seven months. The payment in one month of N$100,000 
was constant throughout all scenarios. The payment in seven months increased from 
N$104,881 in the first scenario, which corresponds to an annual interest rate with quarterly 
compounding of 10%, to N$122,474 in the fifth and last scenario, which corresponds to an 
interest rate of 50%. Values for later payments in the scenarios in between the first and the 
last were chosen in such a way that the corresponding interest rate increased by 10% per 
scenario.  
In these kind of experiments, subjects typically prefer the earlier payment when the later 
payment is low and switch once the later payment is deemed high enough. Out of the switch 
point we constructed a time preference index as an integer variable with values in {1, 2, …, 
6} where high values denote high impatience and thus imply a high discount rate, i.e. those 
farmers who only switch to the later amount when it is high. The highest possible value ‘6’ 
denotes very high impatience, i.e. those farmers who never switch to the later amount. 
Including the time preference index as an additive control variable in regression Equation (8) 
yields the following augmented equation:  
r ^ =   r ^o + r ^MEAN · MEAN + r ^CV · CV + r ^YFPA18 · YFPA18 + r ^CV × YFPA18 · (CV × YFPA18)  
+ r ^TPI · TPI + r ^X ·X                     ( 1 0 )  
where TPI is the time preference index. Including the index reduces the sample size to 874 
choice from 79 farmers due to an experimental artifact akin to what we observed in the risk 
experiments (cf. Appendix A.2). 
Estimating this regression as Specification (7) confirms our results in Specification (3): all 
coefficients remain in the same order of magnitude and retain the sign, and significant 
(insignificant) coefficients remain significant (insignificant) (Table 4). The time preference 
index itself is significant at the 1%-level and has a coefficient of -0.027. Thus, farmers who 
are less impatient (have a lower implied discount rate) are more risk averse. These findings on 
the time preference index conform to Anderson et al. (2008a) who study both risk and time 
35preferences and who estimate a lower discount rate if they consider that experimental 
participants are risk averse instead of risk neutral. Altogether, control for time preferences 
does not change our findings on the relationship between risk preferences and precipitation 
risk, and the parsimonious model we estimated in Specification (3) thus captures adequately 
the relationship between risk preferences and environmental risk. 
 
 
36Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimation of expected utility model of choice. Specification (3) as in Table 3. 
Specification (4), (5) and (6) denote life history by the binary variable GREWUP with the age threshold set at 0 
years, 9 years and 18 years, respectively. The interaction effects between life history and precipitation risk are 
calculated correspondingly. Specification (7) is as (3) but includes a time preference index. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Parameter  Variable  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
r  Constant  1.382*** 1.378*** 1.383*** 1.362*** 1.402*** 
    (0.124) (0.126) (0.127) (0.148) (0.154) 
  Real  payout  0.672*** 0.671*** 0.674*** 0.650*** 0.691*** 
    (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.119) (0.133) 
 Female  –0.342***  –0.323***  –0.347*** –0.301*** –0.327*** 
    (0.116) (0.109) (0.117) (0.107) (0.106) 
  Low  education  0.069** 0.065** 0.069** 0.052*  0.080*** 
    (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) 
  Area  of  rangeland  0.000 0.000 0.000  –0.000 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Multiple  owners  –0.067***  –0.065*** –0.065*** –0.053**  –0.043* 
    (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
  Living  off-farm  –0.043 –0.058*  –0.034 –0.054*  –0.026 
    (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
 Liquidity  constraint  –0.005  –0.004  –0.005  0.002  –0.006 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
 YFPA18  –0.003**       –0.003*** 
   (0.001)        (0.001) 
 G REWUP   –0.041  –0.053**  –0.029   
     (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.021)   
  Mean of precipitation  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  CV  of  precipitation  –0.732** –0.635** –0.718** –0.531*  –0.533** 
    (0.286) (0.277) (0.281) (0.285) (0.252) 
  CV x YFPA18  0.081**        0.110*** 
   (0.038)        (0.042) 
  CV x GREWUP   1.696**  1.303**  0.360   
     (0.758)  (0.633)  (0.630)   
  Time preference index          –0.027*** 
         (0.008) 
 Female  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Constant  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Log-likelihood  –321.4 –322.7 –321.5 –330.3 –293.4 
  Chi-square  67.67 69.64 68.71 73.64 56.70 
  Model  significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Observations  994 994 994 994 874 
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